and Hawaii -considered reducing their full exemptions for pension income, only to be met with strong resistance. At the same time, Maine Governor LePage began a push to exempt all pension income from income taxes, at an estimated annual cost of $93 million. This proposal follows Georgia's 2010 legislation that raises the exempt amount of "retirement income" each year such that all income is exempt by 2016. 1 As the population ages and fi scal pressures mount at the state and federal level, these policies seem likely to stay at the forefront of public debate. Yet, we know surprisingly little about their origins.
2 In this paper, we take a two-pronged attack in fi lling this gap. First, we carefully document the history, testimony, language, and context of the tax laws to search for evidence of why they were adopted. Second, we estimate a standard model of policy adoption to explore the state characteristics that are most strongly associated with such tax breaks. The history reveals several key tendencies. Such policies were not, in general, part of the original state income tax systems and, depending on the specifi c tax break and time period, their subsequent adoptions appear to be attributable to following the federal government, competing with neighboring states and, sometimes, an oversight or as an expedient way of dealing with pre-existing law. The econometric results reinforce these fi ndings and show that the two types of tax breaks (aged exemptions and exclusions for pension income) were driven by different sets of factors. In sum, although current rhetoric strongly suggests that tax competition is at work, our research suggests that these tax breaks did not start out that way.
3 Rather, they appear to have accidentally made their way into the tax code; once in place, however, their diffusion -especially that of pension exemptions -appears driven by competitive and political factors. Figure 1 shows the percentage of states with income tax systems that have an aged exemption/deduction/credit (henceforth called "aged exemption") and that have an exemption for pension/retirement income (henceforth called "pension exemption"), over time. 4 The pattern of adoption for aged exemptions is distinct from that of pension exemptions, coming as an earlier "wave" of adoptions than the pension exemption. Our history and econometric results reveal that the factors underlying their adoption and diffusion are quite different as well. Interestingly, though, both fi rst originated in the state of Vermont and arose due to an oversight.
II. A HISTORY OF INCOME TAX BREAKS FOR THE ELDERLY

A. In the Beginning …
In 1916 the federal personal income tax was enacted and only seven states had income tax systems; none contained senior tax breaks. By 1928, 14 states had enacted income taxes and another 18 enacted income taxes between 1929 and 1935. One of those states was Vermont, which in 1931 replaced its intangibles tax with an income tax on two types of income, one closely linked to "income derived from intangibles" and taxed at a higher rate, and the other normal/earned income (Vermont State Tax Commission, 1930) . Neither defi nition included pension income -or any other form of transfer income. To the best of our knowledge, this omission marks the fi rst senior income tax break. However, it seems to have been due to an oversight rather than a deliberate action because pension income was likely rare in Vermont.
While states began enacting old-age assistance (OAA) programs as early as 1915 (Costa, 1998) , the programs enacted prior to the Social Security Act of 1935 (SSA35) were quite limited in their scope and several states, including Vermont, did not have one. In addition to creating the Social Security program, SSA35 encouraged state oldage programs by offering federal subsidies for old-age assistance. Twelve months after SSA35, 36 states plus DC had developed old-age programs and were receiving federal payments. Vermont was one of several states that did not enact an OAA program until after SSA35 encouraged states to do so; it therefore seems likely that pension income 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 States ( The Commissioner of Taxes has called to our attention the fact that the great increase in Federal Taxes under the present income, unemployment, social security, old age assistance, and railroad retirement laws, all of which were not in force at the time the State income Tax Law was passed are now deductions from the Class A or business tax base, and have decreased our tax revenue to a considerable extent. We recommend that the Ways and Means Committee of the House give consideration to the fact of this loss of revenue.
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It is also notable that no other state enacted any senior income tax break for another 16 years.
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It was SSA35 that inadvertently led to the fi rst federal senior income tax break. The original law was silent on the tax status of Social Security benefi ts; in 1941, an offi ce ruling by the Income Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue stated that Social Security benefi ts "…are not subject to Federal Income Tax in the hands of recipients," (Ratchford, 1953, p. 158) .
7 However, evidence exists that, similar to Vermont, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) advocated adding them to the tax base:
These diffi culties include inequalities arising from the exemption of certain classes of payments such as Railroad Retirement and Social Security old-age and survivors' insurance benefi ts, as well as defects in the present method of allowing for the tax-free recovery of the capital element in annuities. It would also help to decrease demand for the creation of further exempt classes of pensions and annuities as well as facilitate covering Railroad Retirement and Social Security old-age benefi ts into the tax base, as already recommended by the Treasury Department (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1947, p. 26) .
As it turns out, this last sentence is prescient, as the exclusion of Social Security benefi ts from taxable income was a key justifi cation for the fi rst deliberate federal tax break in 1948, which quickly led to similar provisions being adopted by the states. 5 Journal of the House of the State of Vermont, Biennial Session, 1941, p 13 . Class A refers to "wages, salaries, commissions, fees and business income of all kinds …," (p.11). Class B corresponded to the earlier intangibles tax. 6 South Dakota presents a similar case but was much more short-lived. When it enacted its income tax in 1933, it also omitted pension income from its rather crude defi nition of income; it too did not adopt an OAA program until after SSA35. However, since its income tax was eliminated in 1943, it is not relevant to our analysis. 7 The same procedure led to the tax exempt status of benefi ts paid under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 (Ratchford, 1953) . Most states followed the federal government in treating social security benefi ts as tax-free.
B. The Aged Exemption -A Case of the States Following the Federal Government
In 1947, the war was over, the cost-of-living was soaring, and political forces were pushing for widespread income tax cuts; however, those political forces do not seem to have included the elderly. The old-age pension movements that had arisen in the early 1930s and peaked in the late 1930s fell off dramatically in the early 1940s (Pratt, 1976; Amenta and Zylan, 1991) . The most prominent was the Townsend movement, named after a California physician who advocated that every person over age 60 receive $200 a month, provided the money was spent within one month of receipt (Costa, 1998) . Pratt (1976) notes that there was a hiatus in senior political movements after the decline of the Townsend movement that lasted until the birth of the modern-day senior movement in the 1950s, and we can fi nd no evidence that these early movements showed any interest in gaining preferential tax treatment for seniors. It therefore appears that the fi rst deliberate state and federal income tax breaks actually occurred during a lull in the senior political movement.
Since the late 1930's the income tax base had broadened considerably, as exemptions had been reduced during the war while infl ation with fi xed nominal tax brackets had increased the share of income subject to tax. U.S. Department of the Treasury (1947) provides details of both events and reports a provision under H.R. 1, 80th Congress, a precursor to the Revenue Act of 1948, that proposed a $500 exemption for persons over age 65. At the same time, Vermont was revising its income tax, with the goal of simplifying compliance by making it as similar as possible to the federal tax law (Lasser, 1948) . Its revised tax code defi ned income in a similar manner to the federal government (and thus included pensions) and included a $500 exemption for taxpayers over age 65. As the $500 exemption had been promoted by the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee (Harold Knutson) as early as 1945, we conclude that Vermont was anticipating the 1948 federal tax law when it became the fi rst to deliberately enact an extra exemption for the aged in 1947. 8 The fact that its new law also removed a senior tax break may have come into play as well, although we can fi nd no evidence of that.
The Revenue Act of 1948 established the fi rst deliberate federal income tax break for the elderly. The Act was the result of a wider movement for income tax relief and included in its fi nal form an additional exemption of $600 for any taxpayer who had reached age 65 by the end of the tax year.
9 However, it was not enacted without spirited debate. Those in favor argued that the elderly in particular suffered from low incomes and a high cost of living, and "Unlike younger persons, the bulk of those over 65 could not compensate for these changes in prices and taxes by accepting full-time jobs at 8 See Bryant (1947) for details of the politics of the new federal tax law and evidence that Knutson had been promoting the $500 aged exemption as early as 1945. 9 The Act also increased the general exemption and the exemption for blind individuals from $500 to $600, which we suspect is why the aged exemption increased from the proposed $500 to $600 in the fi nal bill as well. The increase in the general exemption was a revision to the original bill in an effort to increase its popularity among voters. President Truman, having vetoed an earlier bill, had pushed for an income tax credit to better target lower income groups (Bryant, 1947) .
prevailing high rates of wages" (Wolkin and Manoff, 1948, p. 93) . 10 The minority view gave a pointed rebuttal to these points, noting "political considerations":
The special exemption of $600 for persons over 65 years of age, except for political considerations (our emphasis), can be justifi ed only upon the ground that an aged person has a higher cost of living than does a person under 65. The necessary personal expenditures of the aged person are certainly no higher than those of a younger person engaged in active employment and receiving the same income … All low-income taxpayers have suffered severely from high prices and it would be inequitable to grant additional income-tax relief to those over 65 years of age and to deny it to those under 65 years of age who are equally as hard-pressed. The high cost of living is a heavy burden on all low-income taxpayers, regardless of age (Wolkin and Manoff, 1948, p. 95) .
As discussed shortly, these same counter-arguments have been made vigorously many times since.
Another rationale for the exemption was the unequal taxation of retirement income, caused by the "accidental" tax-exempt status of social security benefi ts -just as predicted by the earlier quote from the Treasury: "Among our older citizens, some now receive a retirement check that is tax free. Others pay taxes on their retirement checks. Still others receive no retirement check and continue to work and pay taxes to pay somebody else's retirement check which is tax free," and "This should wipe out the tax on many of the school teachers of the Nation who are now paying either taxes on their salaries, or taxes on their annuities." The minority argued, again presciently, that if the exemption is adopted there will be "… a fl ood of similar exemptions for teachers, veterans, retired civil servants, the partially and totally disabled, and other groups." A fi nal rationale for the exemption is that social security benefi t levels needed to be increased and, barring that action, "… then let us make some other provision for these people" (Wolkin and Manoff, 1948, p. 96) .
With the aged exemption in place at the federal level, the states quickly followed suit (Figure 1 ). Figure 2a shows the geographic spread of the aged exemption and Table 1 reports the chronology of adoption dates and exemption amounts. Perhaps coincidentally, the fi rst state to adopt an aged exemption after the Act -Colorado -was also home to the chief sponsor of the Senate bill, Senator Eugene D. Millikin (Morriss, 1948) . 11 Maryland and Virginia followed in 1950 with exemptions matching that of the federal policy ($600). By 1960, 15 states plus the District of Columbia had adopted an aged exemption, deduction or tax credit, with most being exemptions of a magnitude similar to the federal government's exemption and the remaining being modest income tax credits ranging from $5 to $15 per person. The spread of this tax break continued throughout the 1960s and most newly adopted income tax systems (e.g., Michigan in 1967 , Illinois in 1969 , and Ohio in 1972 included one as well. 12 By 1980, 90 percent of states with income taxes had an exemption/deduction/tax credit for the elderly. As has been discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g., Rork, 2008b, 2012a) , the Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the federal exemption to an extra standard deduction that
by 1950 1951 -1955 1956 -1960 1961 -1965 1966 -1970 1971 -1975 after 1975 No 
Geographic Patterns of Adoption of Aged Exemption
12 Pennsylvania is an interesting exception in this regard. Pennsylvania had its fi rst proposed income tax, which was based on the federal code, ruled unconstitutional in large part because of exemptions. As discussed shortly, this prohibition of exemptions may be why Pennsylvania ended up excluding pension income from its defi nition of the income tax base.
Table 1
Year State had an income tax system based on federal tax liability, hence federal elderly exemption is automatically granted.
2
Arkansas gives a choice of a $17.50 age credit or the pension exemption.
by construction is only available to itemizers. This change combined with the reduction in marginal tax rates signifi cantly reduced the value of this tax break. Once again, the states followed suit. The timing, similarity to federal law and lack of strong geographic patterns of state aged exemptions leads us to conclude that it is primarily a case of the states following the federal government and not a case of tax competition.
C. The Pension Exemption -A Case of Interstate Tax Competition?
As evident from Figure 1 , the wave of pension exemption adoptions is distinct from that of the aged exemption, beginning about 20 years later in the early 1970s. They also differ because state pension exemptions diverge from federal tax law rather than follow it, as the federal government has always taxed all types of pension income, with the notable exception of Social Security benefi ts and Railroad Retirement benefi ts (both believed to be "accidental" tax breaks). As noted above, Vermont was the fi rst state to exempt pensions, likely as an oversight, in 1931. It eliminated its pension exemption when it revised its income tax in 1947, replacing it with an aged exemption. In that same year, Delaware added an amendment to its income tax that exempted all pension income. However, it is possible that this action, too, was designed to address an earlier oversight, as the earlier Delaware tax laws -while defi ning net income broadly -do not specifi cally mention pension income. 13 In any event, the full exemption of pension income in Delaware was short-lived; in 1953 the law was revised again to reduce the exemption to $2,000 and to enact a new $600 exemption for the aged. Other than Hawaii's exemption of pension income in 1954, no other actions were taken until the mid-1960s.
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The federal government, however, continued to expand its generous treatment of the elderly in other ways during the 1950s and early 1960s. Beginning in 1942, medical expenses in excess of 5 percent of income could be deducted up to a maximum ceiling. In 1951, the 5 percent fl oor was removed for the expenses of taxpayers over age 65 -as well as their spouses, even if they were under age 65 (Kahn, 1960) . In 1954, the retirement income credit was enacted which was "… aimed at parity privileges for those not covered by Social Security" (Groves, 1963, p. 48) . While examining these provisions is beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that some states adopted them as well. In 1959, a large number of papers were compiled for the Committee on Ways and Means addressing the possible broadening of the tax base. 15 It is telling that an entire section was devoted to the "Taxation of the Aged," and papers in other sections addressed these 13 Moreover, a dissertation devoted to the history and details of the Delaware income tax (Brownlee, 1944) makes no reference to pension income, suggesting it was not a well-known feature. 14 Hawaii is a challenging state to study, given its late entry into statehood and corresponding lack of data during the "initial conditions" period we use to measure state characteristics in our econometric model. Its non-contiguous nature also makes it a natural candidate for exclusion in a yardstick or tax competition model. We therefore do not include Hawaii in the rest of our analyses. Alaska, which does not have an income tax, is also omitted. 15 See U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee (1959) . tax breaks as well. The overwhelming majority of these papers were critical of these tax breaks, citing arguments similar to those made by the minority report back in 1948 (e.g., the cost-of-living is not higher for elderly, relief for low income should extend to all age groups, etc.) as well as erosion of the tax base; these arguments still resonate in the current debate (e.g., Penner, 2000) . Interestingly, the one paper unabashedly favorable to elderly tax breaks, which highlighted inequalities among the aged and called for more tax breaks to close them, appeared as the last paper in the "Taxation of the Aged" section and was written by the then-president of the AARP, Ethel Percy Andrus. Despite the concerns raised in the compendium, the Revenue Act of 1964 further expanded elderly tax breaks, saving the elderly an estimated $675 million (President's Council on Aging, 1964; Chen, 1966) .
On the expenditure side, both the amount and eligibility of Social Security benefi ts increased tremendously during the 1950s (Costa, 1998) . Thus, two of the three primary rationales given for the 1948 aged exemption were addressed by other policies within the decade. Toward the end of the 1950s, the rising health care costs of the elderly rose to the forefront. In 1960, federal-state shared programs were enacted to help pay for the medical care of the elderly, which persisted until Medicare was passed in 1965.
16 Social security benefi ts continued to be increased regularly and substantially. In October 1972, President Nixon signed the Social Security Amendments of 1972, which among other things created the new federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. SSI took the place of what was left of the original state-provided OAA programs. This chronology of federal expenditure programs demonstrates how the needs of the elderly -fi rst their pensions, then their health care needs, and then aid to the elderly poor -were systematically taken over by the federal government such that by 1972 the vast majority of these needs were met by the federal rather than state government. Such a shift in responsibilities could have the effect of making the elderly as a whole -not just the very rich -valuable to a state. And perhaps pension exemptions were the primary weapon in competing for the elderly. To quote the governor of Maine, proposing to remove the tax on all pensions in 2011:
I believe that we need to take income tax off retired pensions … We keep the brain power in Maine, we keep whatever estate they have to their name -we keep that in Maine. We have them available to assist our business community. And a very important thing is they don't put a whole lot of burden on your public services (our emphasis) (Leary, 2011) . 16 The Social Security Amendments of 1960 provided "… increased Federal grants to States for medical care programs for aged people getting old-age assistance if the increase was spent on vendor medical payments. In addition, a new program (commonly referred to as "Kerr-Mills") of Federal grants to States for vendor medical care programs for aged people not on public assistance but unable to pay for needed medical services was provided …"; see Social Security Online, "History -Special Collections, Detailed Chronology," http://www.ssa.gov/history/chrono.html. Figure 1 reveal that the widespread diffusion of pension exemptions did indeed begin around 1972. After Delaware and Hawaii, the fi rst state to enact a pension exemption was Maryland in 1965. Maryland's exemption, however, seems similar in spirit to the federal retirement income credit, designed to establish parity for those who do not receive social security benefi ts. The exemption was tied -and continued to be until frozen in 2011 -to the maximum possible Social Security benefi ts one could receive. Moreover, such benefi ts counted against the retirement income one could exempt. The next two states (Illinois and Pennsylvania) enacted full pension exemptions, after initial legal stumbles and adjustments, as part of their new income tax systems. Illinois treated pensions in a similar way to other forms of investment income when it fi rst enacted its income tax in 1969. Specifi cally, the cost basis of capital assets was defi ned as the value on August 1, 1969 and all income generated prior to that date was exempt; the taxable amount of pension payments was defi ned the same way. In 1971, perhaps as a way to simplify their taxation, the date was removed and all pension income was made exempt. With this subtle shift, the state of Illinois changed from slowly phasing out the favorable treatment of pensions to granting a full exemption.
Pennsylvania fi rst approved an income tax on March 4, 1971 that was levied at 3.5 percent of taxable income, as defi ned by the Internal Revenue Code. The law was struck down as unconstitutional, primarily due to the exemptions used in the federal defi nition which were ruled to violate the state constitution's "uniformity" clause. However, a then-recent amendment to the state constitution allowed the creation of certain classes of taxpayers who could be treated differently, such as the aged, disabled and the poor. The second law, which defi ned gross income in a similar way as the federal defi nition but excluded most transfer payments, social security benefi ts and pension income, became effective on June 1, 1971. We therefore conclude that the full exemption for pension income enacted in both Illinois and Pennsylvania was more a matter of expediency and simplicity than a deliberate act of competition or a yielding to political infl uence.
The case of Ohio, which enacted its income tax in 1972, is less clear. It completely exempted all Ohio state government pensions in the 1972 law. Exempting state pensions was fairly common up until a 1989 federal ruling that required states to extend the same provisions to federal pensions as well. 17 The 1973 law adds a provision exempting up to $4,000 in private pensions as well -but the historical notes report that the exclusion applied to the 1972 tax year as well.
18 Looking at Figure 2b , it is evident that a geographical pattern was beginning to appear, with Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, 17 Note that additional rationales for exempting such pensions exist. For instance, state pensions are paid by the state; by making them tax-free the state can pay a lower amount. In addition, in several instances the laws creating the state and local pensions required them to be exempt from taxation. 18 The delay may have once again been due to a legal issue, as a constitutional amendment was proposed by the Ohio General Assembly and passed by ballot in November 1973 to defi ne the amount of income that is exempt from taxation.
Ohio, and Illinois granting pension exemptions. Table 1 and Figure 1 make clear that the adoption process was beginning to accelerate as well. In 1973, three more states added pension exemptions -West Virginia, Utah and Mississippi. The case of Utah also appears to be a case of dealing with pre-existing law and treatment of public pensions. Utah fi rst began revising its income tax law in 1971 to make it more closely aligned with the federal code; however, the law was vetoed by the state's governor because of ambiguity about its effects on the tax-exempt status of government pensions, as such pensions had been tax-exempt up until that time. The law was revised in 1972 but not approved (Bachman, 1971) . The law that was ultimately passed in 1973 included a $4,800 exemption for pensions, interest, dividends and rental income for those over age 65 and left the tax-exempt status of public pensions intact. State Adopting:
by 1965 1966 -1970 1971 -1975 1976 -1980 1981 -1985 1986 -1990 1991 -1995 after 1995 No The other two states seem more likely to be engaging in competition. West Virginia, like Utah, had laws that exempted state and local pensions from taxation dating from when the income tax was enacted in 1961. In 1973, West Virginia enacted a retirement income exclusion of $4,000 per person. While it too may have been an attempt at parity, both the timing of the law and the opinion of a current state offi cial suggest that it was infl uenced by the behavior of its neighbors.
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Previous to 1973, Mississippi taxed public pensions and was the only state that continued to tax Social Security benefi ts. In 1973, Mississippi -like many stateswas enjoying a sizable budget surplus and therefore experiencing pressure to cut taxes (King, 1973 Since the end of World War II, in odd-numbered years -when all but a few States adopt budgets -Legislatures have increased taxes in substantial numbers … In 1973, however, new or higher taxes were reported in only eight States … Instead, tax cuts were much more numerous than tax raises … Several factors were responsible for this turnaround … State surpluses were widespread … As part of its income tax reduction plan, Mississippi enacted a $5,000 per person pension exemption, which included Social Security benefi ts and public pensions, and a $750 deduction for the elderly. We have been unable to uncover any evidence of the rationale given for these tax breaks, but it seems that the pre-existing laws and legal issues affecting other states do not apply. We also note that Mississippi has been shown to be a fi rst mover in fi rm recruitment (Rork, 2005) . Finally, one of the fi rst mentions in the popular press we have been able to fi nd of states' attempts to recruit the elderly profi les the director of the Hometown Mississippi Retirement program, who in 1997 was traveling the country trying to attract retirees with the state's tax exemption of pension income.
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From 1973 on, the number of states with pension exemptions continued to grow; 11 states adopted exemptions during the 1970s, eight during the 1980s, and another eight during the 1990s. Figure 2b suggests policy competition, especially yardstick competition, as neighboring states often adopted exemptions within a year or two of each other. During this same time period, states also began eliminating their estate, pensions were exempt as well. Evidence exists that the Committee on State and Local Finance pushed to exempt all pension income, with the chief rationale being parity among all types of retirement income. The 1975 law granted a $3,000 exemption for all other types of pension income, including military, for those over age 65. 20 Recall that Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania had all recently enacted pension exemptions. 21 This article noted that 39 of the 48 states with legislative sessions that year had pledged no tax increases, a marked contrast to the previous few years. 22 Mississippi removed all taxes on pension income in 1994.
inheritance, and gift (EIG) taxes beyond the "pick-up" tax, as documented and shown to be due to tax competition in Conway and Rork (2004) . Another piece of evidence has been the states' behaviors on the intensive margin of pension exemptions. Here the story is clear -the average pension exemption offered (excluding states with full exemptions or those with tax credits, which are diffi cult to compare) has steadily grown, from $10, 900 in 1980, to $15,147 in 1990 , to an average of $27,497 in 2010, which is well above the increases needed to adjust for infl ation. Moreover, while several states have signifi cantly increased the real value of their exemptions between adoption and 2010, including Mississippi's upgrade to a full exemption in 1994, no state has actively decreased its exemption. Furthermore, over the last decade many of the proposed and enacted changes have been accompanied by rhetoric emphasizing their importance in competing for the elderly. A fi nal piece of evidence is that the states' behavior during this period has diverged widely from that of the federal government. Beginning in the 1980s, the federal government began reducing its income tax breaks to the elderly, if anything, imposing taxes on social security benefi ts (in 1983 and again in 1993) in addition to reducing the value of the aged exemption (in 1986).
In sum, our investigation into the history of federal and state income tax breaks for the elderly suggests that the fi rst tax breaks were due to oversights, but that they ended up lending justifi cation for more tax breaks. The two primary senior tax breaks also followed very different adoption processes. The aged exemption began much earlier and was a federal policy that was copied by the states. In contrast, the pension exemption marked a divergence from federal policy and, while it fi rst occurred as an apparent expedient response to existing laws and policies, has become a weapon of policy competition. We now turn to our econometric model for a different type of evidence for why and how these tax breaks have spread across the states, explicitly testing our hypotheses that pension exemptions are due to tax competition while aged exemptions are not.
III. AN EMPIRICAL ADOPTION MODEL OF STATE SENIOR INCOME TAX BREAKS
To identify empirically the factors associated with tax break adoptions, we consider two types of variables, whose defi nitions and sources are listed in Table 2 and that derive from the history presented in Section II. The fi rst set includes characteristics of the state that do not change much over time relative to other states. We strive to obtain factors measured prior to the fi rst deliberate adoptions, which suggests using data from the early 1940s, an admittedly unusual period given World War II. When data are available for 1950 as well, we verify that our results are robust to using that year instead. The fact that the results are robust also confi rms our conviction that these factors are measuring fundamental features of a state that don't change much over time. We consider fi ve broad categories: (1) political power variables, which include the strength of the early Townsend movement and public opinion towards pensions; (2) the generosity of the state's OAA program, measured by its adoption year, benefi t level and recipiency rate 23 ; (3) state innovativeness measures, which include private innovation measures 23 Note that adoption years have the opposite relationship as the concept they are capturing, as an earlier (smaller) adoption year implies a more generous -or in the case of tractor adoption, innovative -state.
from Skinner and Staiger (2005) as well as policy innovativeness from Walker (1969) ; (4) elderly characteristics, via their prevalence and mobility in the state; and (5) state economic indicators, with a particular focus on cost of living. The second set consists of variables that do change over time -specifi cally, political, fi nancial, and competitive pressures. Our measure of political pressures is whether the year in question is a gubernatorial election year. In alternative models, we also explore using the year before the election and fi nd no effect. The growth in per capita income captures the fi nancial ability of the state to cut taxes/increase expenditures. Competitive pressures are captured with a weighted average of a state's "competitors" that have already adopted the income tax break. We use three different weighting schemes. The fi rst is a simple contiguity weight, which measures the proportion of neighboring states that have already adopted the tax break. The second is based on historical migration patterns of the elderly and the notion that states are most likely to be competing with those states from/to whom they are recruiting/losing the most elderly. This weight is based on the corridor of elderly migration -the total number of elderly individuals moving between the two states, row-standardized -using migration data from the 1970 Census as in Conway and Rork (2004) . The third weight is what we refer to as random; states are considered "competitors" if they come before or after a particular state alphabetically. This weight provides a falsifi cation test, as this measure of competitors' policies should have no effect.
A fi nal consideration in creating the competitor measures is how to treat states without income tax systems. Obviously they have not adopted an income tax break, yet the absence of an income tax may very well make them a competitive threat. We therefore treat them in two alternative ways -as if they had an income tax break and as if they do not. The fi rst scenario assumes that the state views such states as equivalent to one that has adopted a tax break (since retiree income isn't taxed) and is therefore a competitive threat, while the second assumes the state views these states as not offering any special treatment to seniors (because no one's income is taxed). Our results are robust to either treatment and so we only report the results for the second scenario.
A. Empirical Approach
The very limited number of events -only 43 states have income tax systems during our sample period of which 38 and 33 adopt aged exemptions and pension exemptions, respectively -requires parsimony in our estimation strategy. We therefore begin by examining the pairwise correlations among the time-constant, state characteristics as a way of confi rming our prior beliefs that variables within the same category are capturing the same fundamental tendencies. 24 In general, the correlations among variables within the same category are indeed often signifi cantly positive; some are so high as to be largely redundant and so we do not carry them forward. Pairwise correlations provide two additional pieces of information as well. First, the correlation between the adoption years for the aged exemption and the pension exemption is very low at 0.09 and is Table 2 Variable Names, Descriptions, and Sources
Variable Name Variable Description Variable Source
Dependent Variable
Aged exemption The year a state adopted a tax exemption/deduction/credit based on age Bakija (2011) Pension exemption The year a state adopted a pension exemption Bakija (2011) Political Power Townsend Number of Townsend clubs per 100,000 people Amenta and Zylan (1991) Gallup believe 1 Percent responding yes to "Do you believe in gov't old age pensions?"
Gallup Polls, 1938 Polls, -1941 Gallup all Percent responding yes to "Do you think pensions should be given to all old people?" statistically insignifi cant, providing statistical evidence that the two adoption processes are unrelated. Second, the correlation between the adoption year and each state characteristic is a simple way of testing for an association. Townsend membership and the percentage of homes with PCs are the only two variables with a statistically signifi cant correlation with the aged exemption. Both are associated with an earlier adoption; the other private innovation measures, OAA generosity, and a high cost of living are also associated with an earlier adoption but are not statistically signifi cant. For the pension exemption, the pairwise correlations are somewhat puzzling. Townsend, public opinion, OAA generosity and innovativeness are associated with a later adoption, but only Gallup All and OAA benefi t level are statistically signifi cant. Useful as they are, these correlations have at least three limitations: (1) they only capture bivariate relationships: (2) they are not appropriate for studying the time-varying variables; and (3) they cannot control for the fact that states become "at risk" of adopting an income tax break at different times -i.e., a state cannot adopt an income tax break if it does not yet have an income tax system. We therefore augment the correlations by estimating the adoption of each type of tax break with a Cox proportional hazard model that includes time-varying covariates. As discussed in Jones and Branton (2005) , the Cox model is superior to other methods such as the stacked logit because it does not require specifying or controlling for the baseline hazard. The decision to adopt the income tax break is empirically modeled as the probability that each state in the "risk set" will go "next." In our sample, the risk set sometimes grows as new states enter when they adopt income tax systems. States exit the risk set -for good -when they adopt the tax break. Since it is very rare in our data for a state to subsequently drop its tax break, this approach seems appropriate. Because of the "accidental" nature of Vermont's pension income exemption and the fact that it was repealed well before the diffusion process began, we specify Delaware as the fi rst adopter. The analyses of both tax breaks therefore begin in 1947, with Vermont's adoption of an aged exemption and Delaware's adoption of a pension exemption.
B. Cox Proportional Hazard Results
The limited number of events precludes including all of the variables in the model; even including one variable from each time-constant category (5) plus the time-varying variables (3) seems infeasible (8 explanatory variables plus a constant with 38/33 events and 43 states in the risk set). We therefore begin with the simplest model that includes only the three time-varying variables (growth in per capita income, election year and competition). To this model, we alternately add each time-constant variable. This exercise confi rms whether the patterns revealed by the correlations stand up to the inclusion of time-varying variables and a changing risk set. We then estimate still richer models, with the goals of including variables that capture different features (e.g., a political power variable and an innovation variable) and of conducting "horse races" between variables found to be statistically signifi cant in simpler models. These exercises yield a large number of models, so we only summarize the key fi ndings here. Table 3 reports the results of the fi rst exercise for both exemptions. The fi rst row reports the coeffi cients from models that include only the time-varying variables; the remaining rows report results as each time-constant variable ("Variable 4") is alternately added to the model. For the aged exemption, this exercise confi rms that Townsend membership and private innovation measures are associated with earlier adoptions, although it is now tractor adoption year that is most signifi cant among innovation measures. This approach leads cost-of-living to become the most statistically signifi cant factor in predicting an early adoption of an aged exemption, which is consistent with the stated rationale for the original federal provision. The time-varying variables are never close to statistical signifi cance, consistent with our hypotheses that states were not responding to political or competitive pressures but were instead following the federal government in adopting this tax break.
An entirely different story emerges for the pension exemption. The most signifi cant variable is the "competitor" variable, our measure of tax competition, suggesting that states are more likely to adopt pension exemptions if a large proportion of their competitors (defi ned in Table 3 with contiguity) already offer them. Time-varying political pressure -whether it is an election year -is also associated with adopting a pension exemption although it is not quite statistically signifi cant. The Cox estimates for the time-constant variables again mostly confi rm the pairwise correlations. Gallup All and the OAA benefi t level are associated with a later adoption; the innovation measures are now statistically signifi cantly associated with later adoption as well. As another test of whether the two adoption processes are related, the last row reports the results from the model where "Variable 4" is the adoption year for the aged exemption (since that tax break nearly always came fi rst). Once again, we fi nd no evidence of a statistically signifi cant relationship between the two.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the key fi ndings for the second set of exercises. In all of the models we estimate for the aged exemption, the time-varying coeffi cients are never statistically signifi cant, regardless of the weight used and the treatment of no-incometax states. We therefore focus on the effects on the coeffi cients for the time-constant variables of including multiple factors and report a representative set of results in Table  4 . These exercises confi rm that cost-of-living is most likely to be statistically significant, even when other factors are included -i.e., it wins the "horse race." Townsend and private innovativeness are more sensitive but still associated with early adoption. Similarly, all but two of the statistically insignifi cant variables continue to be so when more variables are included. One interesting exception is the percent over age 65. This variable has confl icting effects on political support for elderly programs; it captures the size of the constituency and thus their political strength but also captures the cost of the program. When we include another measure of their political strength -especially Townsend -the effect of percent over age 65 becomes negative, which is consistent with the "program cost" effect. The second variable to grow in importance is the OAA benefi t level. This variable is positively correlated with the innovation measures (which has a positive effect on adoption), so when both are included, a negative effect of OAA benefi t is revealed. This effect could be due to program cost (the tax base involved) or as a policy alternative to tax relief, similar to the "social security benefi ts need to be raised" justifi cation for the federal exemption. For the pension exemption, competitor is consistently important so Table 5 and our discussion of the second set of exercises focus on its different possible defi nitions. The six columns report results from the model that includes the two time-constant variables that are consistently most signifi cant -Gallup All and OAA benefi t -but using a different defi nition of "competitors" and treatment of no income tax states. Recall that two innovation measures, Tractor and PC in Home, are also statistically signifi cant in the simpler models of Table 3 . Adding either of these variables to the models reported in Table 5 has a negligible impact on the competitor coeffi cient, diminishes somewhat the signifi cance of Gallup All and renders OAA benefi t insignifi cant. Neither innovation variable itself is ever close to statistical signifi cance. For the sake of brevity, we report results from simpler models that exclude the innovation variables and note that they provide upper bounds on the signifi cance of Gallup All and OAA benefi t. We therefore conclude that these two variables are weakly associated with a later adoption of pension exemptions. As before, OAA benefi t may be capturing the tax base cost or the policy alternative rationale; we are puzzled, however, as to how greater public support for granting pensions to all elderly individuals, regardless of need (which is what Gallup All measures), might lead to a later adoption. The story for competitive pressures is much clearer, though, as three of the four meaningful defi nitions of competitor yield strongly positive and statistically signifi cant effects. Moreover, the model easily passes the falsifi cation tests; defi ning a competitor based on the state's name yields estimated effects that are resoundingly zero.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Income tax breaks for the elderly are widespread, sizable and at the forefront of several recent state policy debates. Yet, very little is known about how and why such tax breaks came into existence. To fi ll this gap, we study the legislative history of these tax breaks and then test the resulting insights with an econometric model of policy adoption. This history reveals that the fi rst tax breaks occurred by accident; once in place, however, Notes: Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Z-values are reported in brackets.
they were often used to justify additional tax breaks. It also reveals that the two main types of tax breaks -exemptions based on age and exemptions for "pension" income -evolved according to very different processes. The aged exemption arose from the states copying the federal government's decision in 1948 to grant such an exemption as a way of dealing with the postwar high cost of living, the perceived need for greater social security benefi ts and the accidental tax break (tax-exempt social security benefi ts) already in place. The states diverged from the federal government in their adoption of pension exemptions and -after the fi rst few adoptions which seem due to oversights, legal expediency or, once again, accidental breaks already in place -began using them as a weapon of policy competition. Our econometric results are consistent with these insights, as cost-of-living and the level of public pensions are most predictive of a state adopting an aged exemption while having its "competitors" grant pension exemptions is most predictive of a state adopting a pension exemption. As the population continues to age and the fi scal consequences of these tax breaks continue to grow, it seems likely that the fairness and effi cacy of such tax breaks will continue to be debated. Understanding how and why they arose, the rationales given and the criticisms leveled repeatedly throughout their history, is central to such a debate.
